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EFFORTS TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY
IN ILLINOIS1
JAMES J. BABOUR2
The Illinois branch of the Institution of Criminal Law and
Criminology assembles once again with the purpose and hope of
making valuable contribution to the solution of that most absorbing
world problem of how to deal exact justice to all mankind.
The blood that has been shed on the battle fields of Europe is
bringing forth a harvest, and more emphatically is it becoming con-
ceded every day that violation of law and offenses against civilization,
whether the act of an individual, or a community, or a nation, must
be followed by such treatment of the offender as will protect society
from a recurrence of that particular form of disturbance, to say
nothing of the deterrent effect upon others like criminally minded.
These just ends which we seek in the Administration of the
criminal law, on the surface appear simple of accomplishment, but on
closer study we find ourselves almost baffled in our efforts to dis-
cover who are the real offenders in some instances, and what is the
proper treatment or medicine that is to be applied to effect a cure.
Much of our thought will be given today to the suggestions from
distinguished speakers who will discuss the question of the moral
responsibility of offenders. This does not mean that anyone here
will suggest a slackening of the efforts to protect society, or to make
crime hideous, or to strike terror into the heart of the evil disposed.
Rather will the purpose be to seek some humane plan to take the weak
or evil disposed in hand before offenses are committed, with the view
of safeguarding the public and developing to the point of the highest
possible efficiency the elements of good that are inborn, though some-
times very faintly, in every human being.
No matter how abhorrent violence and crime are to us, we will
always be conscious of the fact that people are in prisons, often as
the result of inherited weaknesses, poverty, drunkenness and other
misfortunes rather than from real vicious inclinations, and if we can
'President's Address before the Illinois Branch of the American Institute
of -Criminal Law and Criminology, Chicago, Dec. 28, 1918. -
2Illinois State Senator and President of the State Branch of the American
Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology.
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help them and people like them to better living, we are doing a
positive good to the welfare and peace of society in general.
The May-scents down the nightland
Blew wild and cool and far,
And a free sweet air flung leaves to where
Swung a little free white star
By the long wall and weary
Where the Prison-People are.
They were the foolish children
Who could not find their way
From out their night to any light,
Nor knew that there was day.
And the evil night-roads called them,
And their weak feet went astray.
They were the crippled brothers
Who could not tread so fast
The paths 6f wrong as the swift and strong
Who did their deeds and passed;
But blundered in their sinning
And were trapped and bound at last.
They stay shut close from wandering
And we go free outside;
There must be bars-yet oh, the stars
So high and the world so wide,
So near the little darkened cells
Where the Prison-People bide!
How can we tell the evil?
How can we tell the right?
How shall we part, who see no heart,
The darkness from the light?
We only know that free we go
And they lie still in night.
The felonious killing of a human being has always been regarded
as the most serious offense against society that can be committed,
because we put a value on human life far greater than is given to
property rights. We are as much concerned today as ever to protect
life, but so long as people are killed and murders are committed the
efficiency of existing preventive measures will always be debatable.
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The doctrine of a life for a life goes far back to antiquity, but
while in a number of states in this country capital punishment is the
mandatory penalty for murder, in an increasingly large number of
states the death penalty has been abolished. In Illinois the alternative
penalties which juries are allowed to impose stand as a slight conces-
sion to that feeling of repugnance that is in almost every breast against
the taking of human life, even by judicial sentence.
So great is the sentiment against the extreme penalty that a bill
abolishing capital punishment passed in both houses of the Fiftieth
Assembly in our State, and only failed of enactment because of the
,veto by the present Governor.
An attempt was previously made in the forty-ninth assembly,
but the bill there failed of passage. The movement had the strong
endorsement of Governor Dunne, who on various occasions, official
and otherwise, bad given his reasons for opposition to capital punish-
ment.
The movement in this state has its strongest support from those
of pronounced ideas, who believe that it is -morally wrong to take
human life under any circumstances short of self defence, or war.
These people are the pioneers'who, as years come and go, will, as have
pioneers in other great moral movements, be more and more respected,
and eventually gratefully lauded for bringing the effort to complete
success.
A strong element that is now adding support to this effort are
the alienists, psychologists, and practical workers in the field of
criminology who insist that the culprit should be dealt with in the
way of punishment only to the degree of responsibility and that
there must be an end to the sickening attempt to hang imbeciles and
defectives from whom oversight and necessary mental and physical
and material treatment have too long been withheld.
A strong influence against these righteous efforts is the notion
in the minds of many of our prosecutors, unconscious of its presence
though the particular individual may be, that the ability and success
of the State's Attorney is measured by the number of verdicts of
hanging that he turns in. In giving my own observation and exper-
ience with reference to this subject, I quarrel with no one, nor take
any adverse position on the question that society has a right to protect
itself, and that certain offenses may be of so horrible a nature and
the heart of the actor may be so malignant, that death should
inevitably follow. I have not arrived at the point where I could not
conscientiously vote the death penalty were I on the jury. I am will-
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ing to withhold my inclinations to discuss or to consider society's
responsibility to itself for taking human life until such time as the
indifferent public knows more of the futility of capital punishment
and the danger in its application, than they do now. While referring
to the suggestions often made of the benefit that accrues to society
in having this penalty remain upon the statute books, let us recall the
fact that the Senator who made the strongest argument in the Fiftieth
Assembly against the passage of the bill to abolish the death penalty
made an admission, the truth of which must sooner or later be
recognized. I call attention to the statement of Senator Jewell, Senate
Debates A. D. 1917-336; "In the. great city of Chicago, by reason of
its enormous population, and by reason of its complex condition, and
by reason of its people and its different nationalities and customs,
murder is frequent. The infliction of the death penalty does not stop
it. The infliction of any penalty won't stop it. It never will be
stopped as long as the world stands, whether this law is taken off the
books or whether it is not taken off." When it is realized, and fairly
acknowledged by society that the taking of human life is to some
extent an incident in the grouping of peoples in large communities
and happens regardless of penalties to be visited upon the offender,
we will have approached very near to the point where the propriety
of the extreme penalty can be sanely and judicially determined.
For the present, however, we will confine ourselves to the dis-
cussion of the following propositions:
1. There is a sharp distinction between being convinced to a
moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of a man,
in a case where the death penalty is to be inflicted, and in a case where
the punishment is for a term of years, or for life.
2. The danger of convicting innocent men in cases where the
prosecution is doing its utmost to respond to the excitement and
prejudice aroused because of the commission of an atrocious crime
is a reality, and not a conjecture.
3. The measure of punishment in this State where guilt is certain
is dependent upon no fixed standard, but is left to the whim of an
uninstructed and unenlightened jury, and is usually governed by
impressions resulting from the color, or race, or sex of the prisoner,
his poverty, or apparel, his friendships and family connections, the
astuteness and ability of his counsel, or the lack of it, the mental
attitude of.the prosecutor, the judge and the bailiffs, and innumerable
other things which might be mentioned, all of which have no relation
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to the real question as to whether or not the killing is of that extreme
degree, of premeditation or viciousness which it was the intention of
the framers of 'our laws should be the only excuse for resorting to
the death penalty.
4. The lawlessness of our police, their connivance with vice and
liquor forces, their military code of conduct with reference to them-
selves which makes the administration of an oath seem farcical, all
of which create a distrust warranted by the facts disclosed in innumer-
able police prosecutions in many of the large cities of the country, and
warranted also by the observation of everybody in touch with criminal
procedure, is another factor which contributes to the great danger of
unjust or excessive punishment being rmeted out in murder trials.
Necessarily this paper will be the result of personal experiences
during five years as a prosecutor in probably the busiest office in
America-an experience based on the, personal handling of as many as
seventy-five murder trials, and observation of procedure both before
and since that official service.
Take the first point, that one can be fully convinced of guilt if
only imprisonment is to follow, where doubt would arise if the death
penalty was to be imposed.
Juries returned death verdicts against three prisoners whom I
prosecuted. In each instance the, court and prosecutor were convinced
that the conditions warranted the changing of the sentence to life
imprisonment. The jurors in each case had done their full duty, and
from their knowledge, confined as it was solely to the evidence before
them, they returned the only verdict that conscientious men in such
a case could return. In the first case three men were on trial for
killing a saloon-keeper as an incident 'to a robbery. At the end of
the State's case there was absolutely- no evidence against one man,
who we had strong reason to believe was the one that had fired the
fatal bullet. The identification of the other two defendants rested
solely upon the testimony of a Hebrew bartender, with some slight
corroboration as to .identification of these two defendants as being
the parties seen near to the tragedy. It was known to the jury that
the youihg men had sometime previously been involved in another
robbery, and had been confined in the Bridewell, and perhaps else-
where. As against this single identification, convincing as it was to
the prosecution, there were the denials of the defendants, an alibi
sworn to. by eighteen witnesses, and the knowledge that the most
active police Officer in the case was .a heavy drinker, and frequently
• 504
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accused of misusing prisoners. Subsequently he was discharged from
the force. The defendants and their relatives accused this man of
persecuting the boys and their families for years. The prosecuting
witness was necessarily much in the company of the police before he
announced his positive identification of the defendants. There was
in this case some slight error as to the admissibility of testimony,
which would have served as an excuse for the reversal of the case, had
the Supreme Court felt that the proof of guilt was not of that over-
w.helming nature which is more satisfactory in a death case. This
was a case that undoubtedly would have invited activity by clergy
and others who might have become overenthusiastic in their desire to
save a human life without reference to the evidence.
Let me say that while those two men have been in the peniten-
tiary for years, and will probably dies there, my conscience is clear,
and I feel convinced of their guilt; yet I feel that to have allowed
those men to have been hung on that evidence would have been
monstrous, and I would have always been haunted by the fear that
the Hebrew was mistaken, or had been overpersuaded in making the
identification.
In another case two Italians were at enmity. They were both
habitues of one of the foulest and most notorious houses of ill-fame
in the city. They were both enamored with an inmate. One day one
was seen pursuing the other in the streets, and when he reached him
'he shot him in the back and stood over him and continued to shoot
until the man was dead. There was no doubt that the man committed
the act, and that is was murder. In this prosecution I had the unin-
vited aid of an attorney, in the employ of the keeper of the resort, who
himself was in court, a very interested participant in the trial. The
defendant was absolutely friendless, and could speak 'English none too
easily. Counsel had to be assigned to him. They did the best they
could, which wasn't saying a great deal. The jury, governed by the
light that they had, did the only thing possible, and imposed the
penalty of death, but the prosecution had no way of determining the
causes that led up to the killing. It might have been that the prisoner
was in danger of assassination-that there were intrigues against him
growing out of all kinds of criminal conspiracies and associations
within the walls of jn institution which the police should have long
pridr thereto suppressed. The distinguished judge who tried the case
died before a motion for a new trial was heard, and we were glad, after
negotiation, to reduce the penalty to life imprisonment, especially as
before the trial commenced the prosecution's suggestion of a plea of
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guilty with a penalty of twenty years had been rejected.
Society was no better or worse off by reason of this man's being
allowed to live, but we have the satisfaction of knowing that one of
the worst offenders in the city of Chicago against law and decency,
whose corrupting influence and venalty has made him for long years
notorious, did not have the satisfaction of directing the course of
justice in that case.
It is hard to believe that the death penalty is justifiable, when in
one instance a jury renders a verdict of death, and later on, another
jury on a subsequent trial in passing on the same evidence imposes a
term of years only, or in some instances a verdict of not guilty. Law
can hardly invite veneration, when we realize the injustice that might
have been done to an individual by sustaining a verdict of death, when
subsequently on a new trial twelve equally conscientious men return a
verdict of not guilty. Very hurriedly I am going to cite some cases
of local renown, where the uncertainty of guilt or the liability of the
imposition of an extreme and unjust penalty was so great as to have
almost made the state itself guilty of murder.
Let me direct your attention to the case of Nick Marzen, who was
convicted in Cook County and sentenced to be hung. The Supreme
Court reversed the case for error. He was tried again and sentenced
- a second time, and the case was reversed. The third time the jury
fixed the punishment at thirty years in'the penitentiary.
In the case of Thomas Synon, who was convicted of the murder of
his wife, and sentenced to be hung, the Supreme Court reversed the
cause and on a retrial the defendant was acquitted by a jury.
In the case of one Jocko Briggs, tried in Cook County, and sen-
tenced to be hung, a new trial was granted by the Supreme Court,
and Briggs was acquitted. Opinion is very much divided now as to
whether or not the man was guilty. A captain of police has told me
more than once, that he knew absolutely that Briggs was irinocent.
In the case of one Billik who was convicted and sentenced to be
hung, and the sentence affirmed, many people claimed that he was
innocent. I thought he was guilty. It was proven that one of the
State's witnesses had committed perjury. The sentence was commuted
by Governor Deneen. Later Governor Dunne released the man, the
pardon being granted on the ground that the man was innocent. . -
I I stood at the bedside of a policeman named Mooney, who had
been shot on the street while on duty. In the same room was Mrs.
Mooney; also the Assistant Chief of Police, since then a chief of police.
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There was also present, an inspector and a captain, and a young man
in custody was brought into the room. Mooney looked at him, and in
his dying statement-he died three hours after that-he said "That
man is the man that shot me. I know him, I have arrested him before,
and I have had him up in the police court. I don't know why he
should shoot me, but he did." Within a week the inspector that stood
there and heard that statement arrested somebody else, who confessed
that he was the man who shot Mooney, and who was afterwards tried,
pleaded guilty and sentenced to the penitentiary.
This case alone is sufficient warrant for me in always standing
against the death penalty. The Chief of Police was my personal
friend, a well meaning man, who while he lived enjoyed the confidence
of the people more than anyone who has ever held that office. It was
necessary that Mooney should assert that he knew that he was at the
point of death. His responses to my vague questioning leading up
to such an avowal were unsatisfactory, in that they suggested that
he didn't appreciate his critical condition. Whereupon the Chief of
Police stepped to his bedside, and towering far above him, gave him
the military salute, adding "We are here with the State's Attorney
for a statement. You know what is necessary. Go ahead and make
the answers." With this injunction he readily answered that he knew
he was about to die. I had personal knowledge of what led him to
make that statement, but I had no way of ascertaining what caused
him to say that he positively recognized the prisoner as his murderer.
When asked by the State's Attorney on returning to the office as to
whether I had gotten a good statement, I reported that the statement
was a very good one, but there would be no trial, so far as I was
concerned, unless better evidence could be obtained.
In the case of one Muetch, the father of a family, Muetch, while
insane, killed his two children. The State's Attorney sent two physi-
cians to examine him. They both came back and stated that the man
was insane and didn't understand the nature of his act. A verdict
was rendered which, instead of reciting the 'fact that the man was
insane at the time of the commission of the act, as well as at the time
of the trial, simply recited that he was insane at the time of the trial.
The man was sent to the insane hospital. He afterwards fully re-
covered his reason. Another State's Attorney succeeded to the office.
He was a bit peeved at his predecessor and so this man Meutch, when
he had recovered his sanity, was placed on trial, and on two different
occasions, before different judges, the man who was insane when he
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killed his two children was convicted and the death penalty imposed,
and each time the judge gave a new trial. The State tried him a third
time, and finally the pressure from the judges themselves was such that
the State's Attorney had to stop trying to convict that man. The crime
was so atrocious that any jury was ready to hang the man, regardless
of whether the evidence showed he was sane or insane.
Here is a case, right here in Illinois, happening in 1909, of which
there is an abundance of proof. Neil Shumway, and Illinois b.oy,
went to Nebraska to visit his brother. While there he sought for work
on the farm of a man named Martin. Martin's wife was afterwards
found murdered, and Shumway was accused of the crime and tried
and convicted. Although he stoutly protested his innocence, he was
hung in the Nebraska State Penitentiary in 1909. Three years after-
wards, Martin, the wealthy farmer, died, and on his deathbed confessed
to having murdered his wife, and to having permitted the conviction
and execution of Shumway for the crime.
A Chicago paper in a Sunday issue in 1917 had this dispatch from
Columbia, Mississippi:
"A death-bed confession by Joseph Beard, a farmer, announced to-day
by the sheriff's office, cleared of suspicion William Purvis, who twenty-five
years ago escaped death by hanging after conviction for murder, only
because the noose about his neck slipped when the scaffold trap was sprung.
Purvis was found guilty of killing from ambush one, William Buckley.
When he fell from the scaffold unharmed, spectators who thought it an
intervention of providence, induced the authorities to put him back in jail,
and an appeal to the Governor brought a commutation of sentence. Several
years later Purvis was pardoned. He now lives in Lamar County. Beard,
dying of pneumonia, confessed that he and two other men killed Buckley."
The most recent Illinois case that we recall where the probability
that an innocent man has been convicted is almost apparent, is that of
Ernest Wallace, a colored man, sentenced to death in the Criminal Court
of Cook County, which sentence was reversed in the case of People v.
Wallace, 279 Illinois, 139. Wallace was indicted jointly with one, Edgar
Butler, for the murder of Jacob Levin, a saloon-keeper, who was killed in
a holdup in his saloon. The defendant's guilt depended absolutely upon the
accuracy and the truthfulness of the testimony as to identification by three
witnesses, all of them colored, none of whom had ever seen the defendant
prior to the tragedy. Let us at the outset c1ll attention to the first ear-mark
of police so-called efficiency as shown in the statement in the Supreme
Court's opinion that "the indictment was nollied as to Butler, and no
circumstance appears in the evidence connecting him, even remotely, with
the crime.!
The known inability of colored people intelligently to comport
themselves and make observations following the discharge of a revolver
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in an attempt to commit murder, at once suggests the unreliability of
the testimony in this case. One witness was a colored man named
Porter, and as to him the court says:
"Porter had testified that he was standing at the bar . . . when a man
ran in with a revolver in his hand, which he pointed at the bar-tender * * *
Porter saw the flash of the revolver and heard the shot. He dropped
down, crawling toward the door, and fell over somebody at the door. On
the trial he pointed out the plaintiff in error as the man he saw fire the
revolver in the saloon. Porter had never seen the defendant before, he
knew nobody else who was in the saloon, and on the trial he failed to
recognize any of the witnesses as persons who were in the saloon at the
time of the shooting. .....
"Porter's memory of events occurring after he left the saloon is so
uncertain and obscure, and his testimony as to what he did, where he went
and who was with him is so indistinct and confused, that no intelligent
account of his actions or whereabouts can be derived from his statements."
Able counsel, for small compensation, defended this man and were
able to convince the public finally that Wallace was absolutely inno-
cent. Wallace denied his guilt, denied being at the scene of the robbery
,and denied having met any of the witnesses. He said he spent the
afternoon and evening miles away, at Butler's pool room, 3138 State
street. Three other persons with whom he played "craps" at that
place corroborated him as to the time, place and manner of spending
the evening. In reversing this case on the ground of improbability of
guilt, the court said:
"Recognizing the rule that the question of the credibility of witnesses
is within the peculiar province of the jury and that a verdict in a criminal
case will not be set aside unless there is clearly a reasonable doubt of the
defendant's guilt, it is still the duty of the court of review to determine
this question, and we do not regard the evidence in this record as sufficient
to remove all reasonable doubt and create an abiding conviction that the
defendant is guilty. Reprobation of the crime will not justify conviction of
thfe accused upon evidence which fails to remove every reasonable doubt
of his guilt."
In Cook County it is the poor and improperly defended upon whom
the death penalty is easiest to impose. Take a person who is defective
and who commits a crime, just the kind of a crime that a defective.
will commit; a crime that is more or less heinous and atrocious; and
the jury and the courts are ready to hang that person, and they have
been doing it to some extent.
This notwithstanding the criminal code of this State, provides
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that one to be responsible for crime must have the mentality of at
least a fourteen year old boy. The provisions are as follows:
"A person shall be considered of sound mind who is neither an idiot
nor a lunatic, nor affected with insanity, and who hath arrived at the age
of fourteen years, or before that age if such person knows the distinction
between good and evil .' . . . An infant under the age of ten years shall.
not be found guilty of any crime or misdemeanor."
This is what the Chief Justice of the Municipal Court of Chicago
said in an address before the New York State Bar Association, Jan-
uary 12, 1917, with reference to defectives and the crimes they commit,
and their treatment.
"Several months ago a young man nineteen years of age was accused
of murdering a woman. He has since been found guilty by a jury and
sentenced to hang, which was modified to life imprisonment by the judge.
This young man was in the Boy's Court two years previous to this crime,
and found to have the mentality of a child between ten and eleven years.
He had prior to that time been in the Juvenile Court. The director of the
laboratory predicted to one of the judges, when the defendant was in on
a minor charge, that he would become a serious offender. Our judge
bound him over to the Criminal Court on a felony charge. The Criminal
Court judge released him on probation, having no suspicion of the danger-.
ous character of the boy. The fact that records are made in many instances
before the crime, the findings are free from suspicion of having been made
to meet the emergencies of a particular case."
Very recently in the state of New York where there is no
alternative for first degree murder than the death chair, the Governor
of the State was compelled to commute the sentence of a choir boy,
who was only sixteen years of age when he fell into evil ways and
murdered a shop keeper, whose store he was burglarizing. That boy
gave way to extreme impulses coming at a period in life that is
experienced by every boy. The acts committed in such a period very
rarely have any relation to the subsequent life of the boy, where his
environment is all that it should be. . . In other words, I make te
assertion that we, ourselves, and our children, have reason to thank
Almighty God that through the accident of environment, or for other
causes, our lapses in the adolescent period were not more serious in
the nature and consequences.
The present Governor of this State, who is preeminent because
of the conservatism, sanity and wisdom of his official acts, saw fit to
veto the bill which had been passed, annulling the death penalty. He
gave as justification for his veto, the fact that we are now at war, and
that this was no time to discard long established laws dealing with
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crime. But the good Governor has since had brought to his attention
the unsatisfactory workings of this law, especially in the case of one,
Chicken Joe Campbell, convicted of the murder of the wife of a
former warden of the penitentiary, and sentenced to be hung. This
case, depending as it does upon circumstantial evidence, is worthy of
some comment, especially as it is a fair illustration of the possibility
of error in imposing the extreme penalty. Let me, assert at the outset
that a discussion of this case can be had without reflecting in any way
upon the character of any of the chief actors in the tragedy, other
than thd. prisoner. The student or analyst of crime, upon the first
reading of the tragedy in the newspapers could conceive of any number
of people who" might have committed the deed, and of any one of a
number of motives that might have actuated them. The victim was
a second wife. The husband was out of town. The persons in the
immediate family circle bore relationship to the husband and the
deceased wife that might have made them feel very antagonistic to
the second Wife. I mention this circumstance, having in mind the
famous Lizzie Borden case in Fall River, Massachusetts. Several
prisoners had.access to the living quarters of the warden, and were
in the vicinity at the time of the tragedy. The prior professional
career of the victim, before her marriage to the warden, was naturally
one of the incidents about the tragedy that led to careless conclusions
on the part of those who did not have the benefit of an acquaintance
with the lady, whom by the way, everybody having knowledge spoke
of in terms of highest esteem. The prisoner absolutely denied his
guilt, and the conviction rests entirely upon circumstantial evidence.
The most satisfactory solution of this tragedy, after a consideration
of the evidence adduced, is that Campbell was the guilty party. The
fact that this was also the most desirable solution injects into the case
an element of uncertainty, and provides the possibility of a motive
governing not a police, but a prisofi made case. Conceding the guilt
of this man, everybody must admit that the situation irr which he
was placed by the warden, th unusual freedom and privileges that
were accorded him, all tended to make this crime unavoidable, and
to that exten t a case in which the infliction of the death penalty was
improper. The one most bereaved being at the same time the repre-
sentative of the law, was censurable and guilty of contributory negli-
gence to a degree that made a modification of the penalty highly
advisable. This conclusion is forced upon us upon a reading of the
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summary, made by the distinguished jurist who wrote the opinion in
the Supreme Court.
People v. Campbell, 282 Ill., 614, 625:
"The defendant was an applicant for parole, and his application had
been continued several times. The parole board was to meet on Monday,
the 21st, and Mrs. had assisted him to some extent in reference
to the parole, for which he would naturally have some gratitude, but there
was evidence that he said he was going to get off the job whether he was
paroled or not; that Mrs. -had made him run his legs off and was
too hard to please. The fact, however, that he entertained feelings of
gratitude towards Mrs. for her kindness is not inconsistent with
a belief that in the situation and under the conditions existing in the bed-
room on that Sunday morning, in the stress and sway of an overmastering
passion, nature harked back to primal instincts, and in the. recession grati-
tude to the one who had befriended him, regard for the law, the unspoken
pledge implied by honor from the liberty allowed to him, and even pity for
the helpless victim, had no restraining power and the crime was committed.
That is the only conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence, which
proved defendant guilty beyond all reasonable doubt and to a moral cer-
tainty."
Without disputing the correctness of the conclusion of guilt which
the record of the testimony presents, we insist that here is an instance
where the death penalty added greatly to the task of administrating
that exact justice that will leave the conscience of the community
satisfied that the final result was eminently proper.
The verdict that was rendered in the Campbell case by the twelve
sturdy farmers residing outside of the city where the offense was
committed did not reflect the sentiment of many people in the com-
munity who had given thought both before and after the tragedy to
the peculiar situation that existed. Nor did it reflect the sentiment
and opinion of police and prosecuting officials outside of the county.
The Governor who had appointed that particular warden felt impelled
to send his personal representative to the prison to take charge of
affairs and to see that the rigor of the third degree and the solitary
confinement was suspended. Our present Governor, after the case had
been affirrfied, and the Supreme Court had fixed a new date for the
imposition of the penalty of death, saw fit to commute this sentence.
The Governor was well and fully advised of every circumstance that
indicated guilt, and yet to his mind the case in its result was a very
unsatisfactory one, with features which appealed to him so strongly
as to make the commutation of the sentence imperative. In this deci-
sion the Governor was justified by many things that were brought to
his attention, each one standing alone of so little moment, perhaps, as
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to have no place as, or to rise to the dignity of, evidence in a trial.
Our present Governor went further, and following the course inaugu-
rated by his predecessor in interfering in the management of the
prison, Governor Lowden directed that the prisoner be removed from
Joliet, and that he serve out his life sentence in the Chester Peniten-
tiary, which is located in the extreme southern end of the state.
In contemplating these instances which have been given of the
peculiar workings of the law as to the death penalty in the State of
Illinois, one is impressed with the thought that chance plays too im-
portant a part in the matter of verdicts and in the eventual decision
as to who shall be hung and who shall not. Further it suggests to the
speaker, with his known insistence at all times on the punishment of
the guilty, that the present law is not an aid to the administration of
justice, and" does not tend to bring about a reverence and respect for
law and faith in its justice and fair dealing.
It is respectfully urged that in this age of humanity there should
be some better solution for the problem of the just punishment of
the guilty, and in this connection we assert that the working of the
law in those states where the death penalty has been abolished is much
more satisfactory than in Illinois. Surely in these other states justice
moves more swiftly, punishment is more certain, and law and order
are as well, if not better, maintained than in Illinois, and we submit
that this survey shows strong justification of the action of a majority
of the representatives in the Fiftieth Assembly in voting to change the
present punishment imposed for the crime of murder.
